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Dalit Revolution? New Politicians in Uttar Pradesh,
India
CRAIG JEFFREY, PATRICIA JEFFERY,
AND ROGER JEFFERY
This paper uses recent field research to challenge the widely held view that a
“Dalit revolution” is occurring in North India. Drawing on two years’ ethno-
graphic research in a village in western Uttar Pradesh, the authors uncover
the growing importance of a generation of local political activists among
Dalits (former untouchables) while also showing that these young men have
not been able to effect a broad structural transformation at the local level. The
authors use this case to identify a need for further research on South Asian poli-
tical change that links party political transformation to questions of local level
social practice and subaltern consciousness.
THERE IS A WIDESPREAD consensus among political scientists that a “Dalit revo-lution” is taking place in North India. Building on an analysis of party politics
and electoral transformation, scholars have written of a substantial change in the
relationship between caste and power since the early 1990s (e.g., Jaffrelot 2003;
Kohli 2001). This paper brings new evidence to bear on this argument by focus-
ing on Dalit politics at the local level, with particular reference to a new gener-
ation of low-caste political activists in Uttar Pradesh (UP). In the villages and
small towns of UP, educated Dalit young men have come to challenge the
power of dominant sections of society, raising political awareness among margin-
alized populations and communicating new political and cultural ideas to their
communities. As might be expected, analysis of these self-styled “new politicians”
provides some support for the notion of a Dalit revolution. But there is as yet
little evidence that Dalit political activists have effected a substantial change in
the distribution of economic, social, and political opportunities in rural UP. Con-
trary to the idea that close analysis of local dynamics will uncover instances of
unexpected agency, we use ethnographic fieldwork in a single village to empha-
size the limited and contradictory achievements of Dalit political change “on the
ground.” Our UP case study questions not only the progressive teleology of
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recent accounts of North Indian Dalit revolution but also the dialectic between
democratic political structure and low-caste agency on which political scientists
construct their analyses.
Empirically, then, the paper documents the important but as yet limited role
played by a new generation of Dalit political actors in improving their community’s
access to various social goods.1 We point to the piecemeal nature of Dalit new
politicians’ efforts to act as political and cultural brokers for their community.
Conceptually, the paper restates the importance of local-level ethnographic work
for understanding the dialectics of dominance and resistance within and beyond
rural India. Although village-level studies no longer provide a privileged
“window” on processes of social change in India (e.g., Mendelsohn 1993), recent
analyses of political change in India have moved too far in the other direction.
These aggregative or broad survey-based accounts frequently fail to take seriously
the evidence offered by in-depth village-level research. Among the most important
consequences of this scholarly trend is a tendency to exaggerate the impact of poli-
tical shifts at the state and national levels and to gloss over people’s consciousness of
political change.
We elaborate these arguments through reference to the political economy of
Uttar Pradesh, which is outlined in the next section of the paper, and existing lit-
erature on political transformation in UP, which is introduced in the third section
of the paper. The fourth section of the paper provides a brief description of the
local political economy of the village in which we worked. This serves as a preface
to the empirical “core” of our argument: an account of Dalit new politicians and
their political and cultural work. We show how Dalit new politicians’ attempts to
co-opt and colonize state institutions are effectively “counter-resisted” by a domi-
nant caste of Jats. We then consider the similarly limited efforts of new politicians
to circulate discourses of Dalit empowerment. Dalit leaders’ narratives of low-
caste political change are important in reshaping the symbolic political terrain
in the locality, but the majority of our low-caste respondents felt disillusioned
by new politicians’ ideas of progress. The conclusion examines the implications
of these observations for contemporary understandings of Dalit empowerment
in India.
POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN UTTAR PRADESH
Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in India, containing 166 million
people in 2001 (Office of the Registrar General 2001). On most indices of devel-
opment, UP ranks among the two or three most impoverished states in India
(Drèze and Gazdar 1997; World Bank 2002). In the 1990s, the gross domestic
product of UP rose at an average of 1.3 percent a year, less than a third of the
1We make this argument at greater length in our book (Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery 2008).
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national average. According to the World Bank (2002), 31 percent of UP’s
population lived in poverty in 2000, significantly higher than India’s average of
26 percent, and UP is commonly grouped with Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan as one of the states most in need of devel-
opment support.
The liberalization of the Indian economy from the mid-1980s onward has
tended to deepen rather than alleviate regional and social inequalities in
wealth across Indian states (see Ahluwalia 2001) and within UP (Chandrashekhar
and Ghosh 2002; Sen 1997). This is especially evident in the area of employment
generation (Chandrashekhar and Ghosh 2002). Outside metropolitan areas,
economic reforms have reduced opportunities for government employment, his-
torically an important source of salaried work in rural areas. In 2001, the World
Bank made an annual 2 percent cut in the number of government employees a
condition of its continuing aid in UP. In addition, liberalization has often failed to
generate private-sector jobs (Sen 1997). Simultaneously, economic reform has
frequently reduced the availability of rural credit and therefore possibilities for
entrepreneurialism (Chandrashekhar and Ghosh 2002).
In the social arena, liberalization has had a negative impact on the public pro-
vision of basic welfare, as is evident in the case of education. Literacy rates in UP
are below national levels; in 2001, 70 percent of males and 43 percent of females
over the age of seven were literate in UP compared to nationwide figures of 76
percent and 54 percent, respectively (Office of the Registrar General 2001).
Until the early 1990s, the state was expanding its financial support for govern-
ment schooling. Since that time, neoliberal economic reforms have undermined
government educational provision (Mooij and Dev 2002). With the exception of a
small number of elite colleges, government educational institutions typically lack
teaching aids and equipment, catering facilities, and basic amenities (Jeffery,
Jeffery, and Jeffrey 2005; Kingdon and Muzammil 2003). Moreover, the
midday meal scheme designed to reduce the number of dropouts and increase
school enrollment has been a widespread failure in the state (Hasan 2001).
Similar processes of decay have been described in recent work on UP’s health
care initiatives (Baru 1998), antipoverty programs (Drèze and Gazdar 1997),
and public distribution system (Shankar 2001). For example, Jeffery and
Jeffery (2008) have recorded sharp cuts in UP state expenditures on clinics, hos-
pitals, and medical staff recruitment since the early 1990s that have had a drastic
impact on the rural poor. Widespread corruption within government bureauc-
racies and a wholly inadequate system of taxation further threatens the well-
being and security of impoverished communities and prevents the state from
securing funds for its developmental and revenue functions (Hasan 2001).2
2In 2001, Uttar Pradesh had the lowest ratio of per capita tax revenue to per capita income of all
states in India (Shankar 2001).
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By 2000, the state’s indebtedness corresponded to nearly two-fifths of annual
state income (Singh 2000).
This pattern of state neglect, which has a disproportionately negative impact
upon the poor, reflects the entrenched nature of caste and class inequalities in UP
(Jeffery and Lerche 2003). UP’s population may be roughly divided into three
social blocs. A first bloc comprises upper-caste Hindus, principally Brahmins
and Thakurs, who constitute roughly 20 percent of the population of UP. As
substantial landowners, these castes dominate lucrative salaried employment,
local government bureaucracies, and landownership in many parts of the state
(Hasan 1998).
A second bloc of households belonging to the Hindu “intermediate castes”
frequently controls access to political and economic power in parts of rural UP
(Lerche 1999). This category of households includes the Jats and upper sections
of the so-called Other Backward Classes (OBCs), such as the Yadavs. Jats make
up just over 2 percent of the total population of UP but often act as local “domi-
nant castes” in western parts of the state (Srinivas 1955); they monopolize land-
ownership, nonagricultural sources of wealth, and influence within local state
institutions (Jeffrey and Lerche 2000). Between the mid-1960s and late 1980s,
this “new rural elite” was powerfully represented within state and central govern-
ment (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Hasan 1998). This political power allowed
prosperous Jat farmers to benefit from high agricultural support prices and
large subsidies on agricultural inputs.
The remainder of UP’s population is mainly composed of Muslims, poorer
castes within the OBC category, often called Most Backward Castes (MBCs),
and Dalits. Dalit means “broken” or “oppressed” in Hindi and most commonly
denotes those formerly classed as “untouchable” within the Indian caste
system.3 There are elites among Muslims and Dalits in the UP countryside
and a substantial stratum of wealthy Muslims in many UP towns and cities.
But rural households among Muslims, Dalits, and MBCs typically possess
little or no agricultural land and work in exploitative, poorly paid, and insecure
conditions. This is especially true of Dalits, who have historically suffered from
the stigma associated with being classed as “untouchable” (Mandelbaum 1970).
At the same time, Dalits have been the target of successive government efforts
to raise their standing. In the 1930s, the British created lists of formerly
untouchable castes deemed eligible for special government assistance, called the
“Scheduled Castes” (SCs). The Indian constitution offered SCs legal equality
and reserved places in public-sector employment, educational institutions, and
government representative bodies (Béteille 1992; Galanter 1991). In spite of
reservations, Dalits in UP—most of whom can claim SC status—continue to be
concentrated among the poor and confined to manual labor or small-scale
3The term Dalit is also sometimes used to refer to oppressed people in general in India.
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entrepreneurship in the informal economy (Lerche 1999; Mendelsohn and
Vicziany 1998).
For most of the postcolonial period, political parties have either ignored or
reinforced social inequalities based upon class, caste, and religion in UP
(Hasan 1998). Between 1947 and the mid-1960s, the high castes largely domi-
nated local, regional, and statewide organizations representing the powerful Con-
gress Party (Brass 1985; Chandra 2004). During this period, the high castes
strengthened their control over urban economic opportunities, protected their
rural landholdings, and in numerous other ways defended the boundaries of
their privilege against the incursions of an increasingly voluble but as yet rela-
tively unorganized set of lower castes (Hasan 1989).
The 1967 election marked the beginning of a new phase in UP politics, one
characterized by a decline in the capacity of the Congress Party to exert sustained
control over elections to the state assembly and by the rise of middle- and lower-
ranking castes. This shift was also marked by the emergence of powerful
“farmers’ parties” under the stewardship of the Jat politician Charan Singh that
won power in UP in 1969 and 1977 and exerted considerable influence on
state policy well into the 1980s. These parties provided a vehicle for rural
members of UP’s middle castes, especially the Jats and upper sections of the
OBCs, to enhance their control over landholding and influence local political
organizations and state bureaucracies, particularly in western parts of the state
(Jeffrey 2000, 2001, 2002; Lerche 1995). Indeed, the rural dominant castes
were partially able to maintain their hold over local government bureaucracies
and access to state largesse in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly during the
period in which Mulayam Singh Yadav, a member of the intermediate Yadav
caste, was chief minister of UP between 2003 and 2007.
A third phase of UP politics, beginning in the early 1990s, has been associated
with the political rise of Dalits, especially the emergence of the pro-Dalit Bahujan
Samaj Party (BSP).4 The BSP was formed out of a national trade union for Dalit
government employees founded in 1978 by Kanshi Ram, a Dalit who had
converted to Sikhism. This trade union—the All India Backward (SC, ST, OBC)
and Minority Communities Employee’s Federation (BAMCEF)—comprised
mainly Dalit government employees and sought to fight caste discrimination
within the civil service. In December 1981, Kanshi Ram expanded his political
activities by launching a political party, the Dalit Sohsit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti
(DS-4), which contested its first elections in Haryana in 1982. The BSP took
over the mantle of the DS-4 in 1984. The BSP increased its share of votes in
the UP assembly elections from 9.4 percent in 1991 to 23.2 percent in 2002,
and the BSP formed coalition governments in UP in 1993, 1995, 1997, and
4This section draws on the accounts of the BSP’s history available in Ian Duncan (1997, 1999),
Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany (1998), Zoya Hasan (1998), and Christophe Jaffrelot
(2003).
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2002. In April 2007, the BSP won a landslide victory in the state elections, captur-
ing power on its own for the first time and securing 30.6 percent of the vote. Maya-
wati, a Dalit woman and former school teacher, has led the BSP since 1995.
Under Mayawati, the BSP has been formally committed to assisting “the
majority of society” (bahujan sama¯j). In practice, the party has sought to raise
the political, economic, and social standing of Dalits, especially members
of the most populous and politically influential Dalit caste in UP, the Chamars.
The BSP has pursued this goal through two interlinked but distinct political strat-
egies. First, it has aimed to transform the symbolic landscape of UP through the
creation of parks, statues, and libraries dedicated to Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar and
other Dalit heroes, and by renaming hospitals, educational institutions, and
stadiums along similar lines. The acme of this iconographic program was the
creation of a hugely expensive park in the UP state capital, Lucknow, in honor
of the Dalit hero E. V. Ramaswami Naicker. Second, the BSP has advanced a
strategy of what Kanchan Chandra (2004) calls “patronage politics”: strategies
that entail altering or effecting the implementation of existing government poli-
cies rather than the enacting of new legislation. For example, the BSP has
attempted to change the character of the Indian bureaucracy by transferring
Dalits into key positions within government. During her six-month tenure as
chief minister in 1997, Mayawati transferred 1,350 civil and police officers (Jaf-
frelot 2003, 419), made stringent efforts to recruit Dalits into the police, and
improved Dalits’ access to reserved positions in government training and pro-
fessional courses.5 In these ways, Mayawati significantly increased the number
of legislators and senior civil servants from Dalit backgrounds (Hasan 2001).
Mayawati also tried to instill a “climate of fear” among government bureaucrats
by threatening or performing disciplinary action and implementing a measure—
often called the “SC/STatrocities act”—that made discrimination against SCs and
STs (Scheduled Tribes) punishable with imprisonment. She is pursuing this strat-
egy with equal vigor during her current tenure as chief minister (The Hindu
2007). In addition, Mayawati has extended the Ambedkar Village Program,
which allots special funds for infrastructural development to villages with large
proportions of Dalits.
The efforts of the BSP to improve Dalits’ access to power have intersected
with changes in the formal system of local government in India. In 1992, the
73rd Amendment Act was enacted with the goal of increasing the power of
local government in India. The act implemented a three-tier system of local gov-
ernment in all states of India with populations of over two million people. Under
this new system, village councils (pancha¯yats) would play a central role in the
provision of public services, the creation and maintenance of public goods, and
the planning and implementation of development activities. The act also
5For example, in 1997, Mayawati reduced the qualifying marks for OBCs, SCs, and STs in post-
graduate medical and diploma courses from 35 percent to 20 percent (Froystad 2005, 230).
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provided a periodic 33 percent reservation of pancha¯yat seats for Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women and made provisions for pancha¯yat elec-
tions every five years.
The rise of the BSP must be read alongside the emergence of the right-wing
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a political force. The BJP held power in Lucknow
three times between 1990 and 2005 and governed India between 1998 and 2004.
During these periods of rule, the Hindu Right improved the economic resources,
social connections, and cultural capital of upper-caste Hindus through its econ-
omic policies, political stratagems, and ideological drive (see Hasan 1998). The
ascendancy of the BJP in electoral politics and the increased visibility of
related Hindu nationalist organizations, such as the Rashtriyaswayam Sewak
Sangh and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, has also provided a vehicle for the upper
and middle castes to reassert their social power—what Corbridge and Harriss
(2000) have described as an “elite revolt”—even while the BJP has made political
overtures toward some sections of the Dalit castes in UP (see Hasan 2001) and
has occasionally formed strategic alliances with the BSP.
To summarize, the recent political history of UP has tended to bolster the
position of dominant sections of society. At the same time, the rise of the BSP
seems to have provided some Dalits with opportunities to raise their political
and economic standing. The scale of this “transformation” and the degree to
which it constitutes revolutionary change is open to considerable doubt, as we
show in the next section of the paper.
INTERPRETING POLITICAL CHANGE
There has been much debate over how to interpret Dalit political transform-
ation in Uttar Pradesh. Two distinctive perspectives can be distilled from the
existing scholarly literature. A first view, expressed by Ashutosh Varshney
(2000), Christophe Jaffrelot (2003) and Sudha Pai (2000, 2002), is that the rise
of the BSP has been bound up with a profound, ongoing transformation in
low-caste access to useful social networks, local political power, and cultural
respect. For example, Varshney (2000) suggests that, although the BSP has not
substantially improved the economic position of ordinary Dalits, it is benefiting
Dalits at the symbolic, organizational, and political levels in many parts of
North India. He claims that Dalits are increasingly in a position to challenge
the legitimacy of caste discrimination and to engage in everyday politics. If
democracy is defined as the capacity to contest and participate in politics
(Dahl 1998; Laclau and Mouffe 1985), UP has become much more democratic
since the early 1990s, even if it remains highly unequal in economic terms.
More controversially, Varshney claims that the type of widespread lower-caste
mobilization associated with South India in an earlier period—when a
broad anti–upper caste movement combined with radical class politics led to
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large-scale social and political gains—is likely to be played out again in the urban
streets and village lanes of North India. “North India today, and in future, may
not follow in South India’s footsteps entirely, but the rise of lower-caste politics
in the North already bears striking similarities” (Varshney 2000, 40).
Kohli has also argued that, even where Dalits have not achieved substantial
economic mobility, they have benefited from new forms of party political represen-
tation in otherways.Kohli focuses especially on the symbolic opportunities that poli-
tical change may provide for social groups historically stigmatized within society:
The politics of caste is often the politics of dignity: goals sought are less
broad-based education and health, but more respect, equality of treat-
ment, and symbolic gains. As a result, inclusion of caste leaders into
visible positions of power has often satisfied—at least so far—the
demands of lower-caste groups. (2001, 16)
Jaffrelot’s (2003) scholarship complements Varshney’s work and also parallels
Kohli’s emphasis on the importance of symbolic social change in processes of
Dalit uplift. Drawing upon interviews with leading politicians, analysis of elec-
toral data, and archival research, Jaffrelot maintains that the rise of Dalits
within UP politics constitutes a “silent revolution” in Indian political organization
that includes, but also moves beyond, symbolic change. Like Varshney, Jaffrelot
underlines the significance of education and state-led positive discrimination in
processes of Dalit political transformation. Reservations in educational insti-
tutions and government employment offered enterprising Dalits economic pros-
perity and the skills required to coordinate political campaigns. Jaffrelot then
argues that a newly emergent cohort of Dalit political leaders effected a signifi-
cant transformation in village UP, wherein “power has been transferred, on the
whole peacefully, from upper castes to various subaltern groups” (2003, 271).
Like other authors, Jaffrelot cautions against exaggerating lower-caste empower-
ment: He identifies the partial nature of their political achievements and counter-
resistance among the higher castes. But more than Varshney and Kohli, Jaffrelot
claims that many ordinary Dalits are using their newly acquired political rep-
resentation at the state level to markedly improve their access to local political
resources, social contacts, and economic goods in the UP countryside. Jaffrelot
also makes the bolder argument that, insofar as a revolution has not occurred,
it will work itself out “in the next “several decades” (2003, 494).
The research of Pai (2000, 2002) provides some village-level support for Jaf-
frelot’s and Varshney’s argument that a significant “Dalit revolution” is occurring
in rural UP. Building on survey research conducted in three villages on the out-
skirts of Meerut City, western UP, Pai points to the rise of a new generation of
educated, securely employed Chamar young men who have overturned estab-
lished relationships of dominance. These men represent Dalit interests within
pancha¯yats, act as intermediaries between their community and the state, and
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organize social mobilization. Pai (2000) argues that these men have spearheaded
a “transfer of power” in provincial UP from the dominant groups to Dalits. Akhil
Gupta (1998) makes a more cautious but broadly similar set of claims using
ethnographic fieldwork in Alipur, Bulandshahr District, western UP. Gupta
argues that there has been a shift in the relationship between rich and poor in
Alipur as a result of the rise in nonfarm employment, the decline of the tra-
ditional system of exploitative labor relations, and the strengthening of local gov-
ernment pancha¯yats. Gupta charts a move from a relationship of bondage,
whereby low-caste agricultural laborers were tied to particular forms of work
on the farms of richer cultivators, to a relationship of brokerage, wherein rich
farmers depend upon the votes of the poor to be elected onto the village council.
These positive accounts of Dalit political transformation dovetail with some
ethnographic studies of political change outside UP, especially Anirudh Krishna’s
(2004) description of Dalit political brokerage in rural Rajasthan and Gujarat.
Building on broad-based survey evidence and structured interviews, Krishna
argues that a set of low-caste new leaders is playing a major role in generating
valuable social connections with actors outside the village—or what he calls, fol-
lowing Robert Putnam (1993), “social capital”—at the local level. By acting as
brokers between rural people and the state, these new leaders not only
provide new avenues for marginalized people to obtain political leverage but
also contribute to the erosion of caste-based identities.
Our account of ground-level political change in western UP supports the
work of Varshney, Jaffrelot, Pai, and Krishna in certain respects. Like these
authors, we show that the rise of low-caste politics has altered local-level political
dynamics. We make this argument through attention to the practices of that
cohort of “counterelites” that Varshney and Jaffrelot imagine to be leading pro-
cesses of Dalit political mobilization: the brokers, animators, and “link men”
who figure prominently, too, in a much earlier strain of political anthropology
(see especially Bailey 1957; Khare 1984; Robinson 1988) and most explicitly in
Krishna’s (2004) recent scholarship. But we are more pessimistic than Jaffrelot,
Varshney, and others about the capacity of a new set of local-level Dalit political
brokers to promote democratization in the absence of structural transformation.
The “new politicians” we describe have certainly altered the flavor of local poli-
tics in our research area, but they have not changed the political mood of Dalits
in the village and have done very little indeed to alter the low castes’ bargaining
power with respect to dominant caste farmers, who themselves are engaged in
vigorous forms of local-level mobilization. Our analysis suggests that a vibrant
political movement expressing cultural demands is unlikely to achieve
democratization—in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) sense—
without a radical shift in the distribution of economic and social opportunities
on the ground. Indeed, most Dalits in rural UP are far from satisfied by
piecemeal symbolic gains and feel isolated and disheartened by their exclusion
from basic development goods.
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In making these arguments, our account is part of a wider set of studies to
question the link between the rise of the BSP and the emergence of more demo-
cratic forms of politics in UP (see Hasan 2001; Lerche 1999 for reviews). For
example, in their five-village study of western UP, G. K. Lieten and Ravi Srivas-
tava (1999) conclude that local government institutions remained under the
purview of the dominant castes throughout the 1990s. Lieten and Srivastava
argue that the BSP’s Ambedkar Village Program failed to redistribute social
goods and political opportunities to Dalits and that “[development] benefits
have accrued mostly to people with a nexus with the pradha¯n (village head) or
local officials” (1999, 264; see also Dube 1998; Lieten 1996). Craig Jeffrey and
Jens Lerche (2000) also demonstrate how local elites continued to co-opt local
government bureaucracies and prevent Dalits from participating in meaningful
ways in village politics even after Mayawati’s rise to power. These studies also
stress the BSP’s failure to intervene in rural disputes over land and labor or to
formulate economic policies that would address problems of poverty and inequal-
ity in the state. As both Lerche (1999) and Zoya Hasan (2001) conclude, even
where tightly structured relationships of exploitation between the higher castes
and lower castes have been eroded, Dalits in rural UP are very poorly placed
in local land and labor hierarchies, and this greatly limits their capacity to
contest and participate in politics (see also Brass 1997; Gupta 1997; Singh
1992). Outside UP, Stuart Corbridge et al. (2005) are similarly equivocal about
the empowering potential of village-level brokerage among Dalits in their
survey of poor people’s access to development resources in Bihar and West
Bengal. They note the rise of an energetic cohort of social animators among
Dalits but also stress the highly contingent and reversible nature of the processes
of democratic advance underpinning their rise (see also Chowdhry 2007).
Our evidence broadly supports these evaluations of low-caste political pro-
gress, which, though not wholly divergent from the work of Jaffrelot and Varshney,
place greater emphasis on structural continuities, barriers to democratization, and
the sustained exclusion of most Dalits from effective forms of political action and
expression. By adopting a relational perspective—one that considers Dalit
strategies alongside those of the higher castes—we argue that Dalit new politicians
face multiple class- and caste-based constraints in contesting established structures
of power in the present UP context. In particular, our grounded account of the
extent and nature of democratization highlights the difficulty of assuming that
UP is set upon the type of “path to democratization” associated with revolutionary
change in South India. As Patrick Heller has argued, low-caste democratization in
South India occurred in a “favourable and really quite unique institutional and
political environment” (2000, 507), and UP lacks, in particular, the history of
broad-based class mobilization that underpinned democratization in many parts
of the south.
We advance our argument mindful of a tendency within recent assessments
of political transformation at the ground level in rural UP to screen out analysis
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of Dalits’ own understanding of the transformations in which they are embedded;
while the studies of authors such as Lieten and Srivastava (1999) provide important
ground-level data, they fail to give sufficient space to the expressive practices
through which Dalits understand and seek to navigate their continued subordina-
tion. Inspired by other attempts to understand political subjectivities in South
Asia (Hansen 1996; Kakar 1989), in this paper we link questions of resistance to
the processes through which Dalits express their insecurities and to the affective
dimensions of low-caste lives. To the extent that caste-based political transform-
ations have taken place in rural UP, these changes have been far from “silent”
(Jaffrelot 2003) but rather associated with loud rhetorical efforts to express Dalit
voice and equally strident efforts by threatened elite groups to counter Dalit power.
RURAL BIJNOR DISTRICT
Our research took place in Bijnor District in western UP.6 Bijnor District’s
economy is predominantly agricultural, based on sugarcane, wheat, and rice cul-
tivation. Between 1960 and 1990, new agricultural technologies and high govern-
ment support prices for key cash crops increased agricultural profits and the
demand for labor. The construction in 1984 of a new road across the Ganges
opened up direct links between Bijnor and Delhi and promoted commercial
growth. Nevertheless, Bijnor District lacks a substantial manufacturing base
and is situated outside the area of rapid industrial expansion occurring in neigh-
boring UP districts further west.
The depressed economy in Bijnor District placed particular pressure on
young people seeking nonagricultural work. Government employment opportu-
nities in Bijnor District were concentrated in health, schooling, transport, and the
police. The liberalization of the Indian economy has reduced openings in these
spheres, while flows of investment capital almost wholly bypassed Bijnor District
in the fifteen years following economic reform. As a consequence, the number of
salaried jobs in Bijnor District declined sharply in relation to the demand from
high school matriculates in the 1980s and 1990s.
Our rural field research on Dalit politics was concentrated in the village of
Nangal, which lies roughly 15 kilometers southeast of the town of Bijnor. In
2001, Nangal’s population was about 5,300, of which 48 percent were Chamars,
26 percent Jats, and 12 percent Muslims. There was also a small population of
non-Chamar SCs in Nangal, mainly Balmikis. The remaining population mainly
comprised MBCs but included a few Brahmin households.
The Jats owned 83 percent of the agricultural land in Nangal in 2001, and 54
percent of the 198 Jat households possessed more than two hectares. Landow-
nership was not the only basis for rural power in Nangal, but it remained
6For more on Bijnor District, see Roger Jeffery and Patricia Jeffery (1997).
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crucial in defining a household’s economic and social position. Jats had reinvested
agricultural surplus in small businesses—they managed a wood yard, two sugar-
cane processing units, and several shops and schools—and in efforts to position
their sons in local government bureaucracies.
Jats’ control over land in Nangal and the lack of nonfarm employment oppor-
tunities close to the village suggest that Dalit subordination is likely to be more
intense in this village than in some other settlements in western UP. But there
are other aspects of Nangal that suggest this village might be more advanced
in terms of Dalit assertion. Nangal has a larger proportion of Dalits than many
other villages in the region, and it is located in a district (Bijnor) where Mayawati
won an election in 1989. Moreover, many ordinary Dalits in Nangal claimed that
their village is less characterized by caste oppression than most neighboring
villages.
The Chamars in Nangal were mainly employed as local manual wage
laborers, often on the farms or in the small industrial units owned by Jats.
There was only limited daily, weekly, or seasonal migration among Nangal
Chamars out of the village. Within agriculture, Chamars worked as temporary
daily wage laborers, paid between 25 and 50 rupees per day.7 Yet they were
often unable to obtain regular work or timely payment for their labor. In 2001,
the Chamars possessed 8 percent of the agricultural land in Nangal. Of the
457 Chamar households in the village, only 1 percent owned more than two hec-
tares and 77 percent were landless. Patterns of landownership were paralleled by
inequalities in the material assets of Chamars and Jats; very few Chamars
possessed the private tubewells that are common on Jat farms.8 Moreover, 56
percent of Chamars lived in brick built (pakka¯) houses compared to 89
percent of Jats, and only 10 percent of Chamar households had televisions
compared to 70 percent of Jats.
Inequalities rooted in land and material asset ownership were, in turn,
reflected in Jats’ and Chamars’ differential access to new avenues of advancement
based upon education. Nangal contained two government primary schools and
three private primary schools run by local Brahmins. Jats dominated the manage-
ment committee of the Nangal Junior High School, the larger and better-funded
of the village’s two secondary schools. The Ambedkar Junior High School catered
mainly to Dalits, Muslims, and MBCs and ran classes up to eighth standard.
While facilities and standards of teaching at the government primary schools
and Ambedkar School were particularly poor, all of the primary and secondary
schools in Nangal were underfunded, were badly maintained, and suffered
from teacher neglect.
7In 2001, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to about 40 rupees.
8We do not have accurate figures on disparities in tubewell ownership, but Pant (2004) has pointed
to widespread inequalities between higher castes and Dalits in access to tubewell irrigation across
UP.
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Jat households ensured that their sons entered school at an earlier age,
moved more quickly through school, and stayed in formal education for longer
than Chamars. Jats typically sent their sons to private primary schools in
Nangal, which maintain a better standard of education than the schools used
by Chamars and Muslims. Richer Jats often sent sons to secondary schools
outside the village and sought extra-school tuition in urban areas. As a conse-
quence, very few Jat boys dropped out of school. Although many educated Jat
young men had been unable to obtain secure salaried work, they had been
more successful than Chamars in the search for such employment. Jat young
men were able to trade upon their slightly better education within government
job markets and could mobilize caste or kinship connections with officers
within relevant state bureaucracies. Jats also possessed the money to bribe offi-
cials within increasingly corrupt markets for state employment.
Boys’ participation in mainstream schooling was much lower among
Chamars. Chamar parents spoke of the crippling expense of secondary schools
and the constant financial struggle that they faced to keep their children in
formal education. At the same time, the number of boys being educated in sec-
ondary school rose among Chamars between 1990 and 2001 as a result of a per-
ception of the value of Hindi education (Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery 2004).
Economic necessity forced most Chamars to send their children to local
schools, where standards of instruction were well below those of most urban,
private schools. Chamars said that open casteism involving the formal segregation
of lower caste students in classes and maintenance of separate eating arrange-
ments ended within schools in the 1960s. But some young Chamars reported
teachers marking them down in examinations, interrupting their progression
through school, making demands for bribes, and singling them out for
humiliating punishments on account of their caste.9
Very few Chamar young men who obtained secondary schooling went on to
capture salaried employment, in spite of reservations for Dalits in government
jobs. Indeed, the proportion of Chamars in Nangal between the ages of twenty
and thirty-four who were in secure salaried employment fell from 19 percent
in 1990 to 9 percent in 2000. Chamars argued that reservations made little differ-
ence to their chances of obtaining government work because the competition for
posts in the reserved quota was as fierce and corrupt as within the nonreserved
sector. Chamars’ less prestigious education, relative exclusion from social net-
works centered on government, and lack of money for bribes marginalized
them in competition for government jobs relative to urban members of their
caste and the Jats.
9Children were not passive in the face of this discrimination. Some Chamar students said that they
had partially countered the effects of casteism by strategically mentioning or avoiding mentioning
their caste or religious identity, publicizing acts of discrimination, seeking allegiances with sympath-
etic teachers, or forming close friendship networks within school.
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In sum, Chamars remained economically impoverished relative to Jats. At
the same time, the rise of education among Chamars and the simultaneous emer-
gence of the BSP as a major political force in the state had had an impact upon
Nangal village. Most notably, by the early 2000s in Nangal, a cohort of educated
Chamar young men had emerged who lacked salaried employment but played a
major role in the village in generating support for Dalit political organizations,
assisting in social awareness campaigns, and acting as “cultural brokers” in the
transmission of new ideas (Wolf 1956).
We examined these young men’s lives through survey work and ethnographic
interviews. We began by undertaking a household census in Nangal as an update
to an identical census carried out in 1990.10 We then interviewed a purposive
sample of parents and their children in households with young people between
the ages of fifteen and thirty-four. Our discussions were semistructured: We
had a set of topics that we wanted to address with specific people. These
related primarily to education, employment, marriage, and political activity and
affiliations. We analyzed our interviews using the Atlas.ti data analysis package,
using codes derived from our conceptual framework as well as ones generated
inductively out of our research. We also conducted short periods of participant
observation, usually in people’s homes, the fields, and village streets.
NEW POLITICIANS
There were six Chamar youngmen between the ages of twenty and thirty-four
in Nangal in 2001 who were termed locally naye neta¯s (new politicians). People
sometimes used the epithet “new politician” semihumorously to mock the
aspirations of ambitious young men, but they often employed the term more
seriously to indicate men who circulated political rhetoric in the village and
assumed organizational roles within local institutions. Villagers referred to these
men as “new” politicians because they belonged to a section of rural society—
the Chamars—formerly excluded from local representative and participatory poli-
tics. They also used the term “new politicians” to distinguish local young men with
political aspirations from themore establishedDalit politicians who regularly con-
tested national or state-level elections and had developed a regional power base.
Finally, the term “new” suggested the imagined connection between these
young men and notions of progress (pra¯gatı¯) and development (vika¯s).
Brijpal came closest to conforming to the ideal type of a Chamar neta¯. Thirty-
four in 2001, Brijpal lived in a small two-roomed brick house on the edge
of Nangal with his wife—who was employed as a part-time government
10Jeffery and Jeffery conducted this census during a previous round of research in Bijnor District.
The authors are grateful to the U.K. Overseas Development Administration for funding that
research. For more on our research methods in western UP, see Jeffery and Jeffery (1997) and
Jeffrey (2000).
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a¯nganwadı¯ worker (nursery teacher)—and had two small children. Brijpal
appeared to embody a form of distinguished Dalit masculinity that owes much
to the example of Ambedkar: He was well groomed and wore clean white
kurta¯ pa¯yja¯ma¯, a woolen waistcoat in colder weather, and smart leather
sandals. Also reflecting broader cultures of Dalit political assertion, Brijpal’s
Hindi contained a large number of loan words from Sanskrit, and he regularly
used stories and aphorisms in his speech.
Brijpal grew up in a household possessing 0.33 hectares of agricultural land.
His parents worked as manual wage laborers in the village and were uneducated.
Brijpal had studied up to tenth class at local schools and then attended a
government-aided intercollege in Bijnor for his senior secondary school edu-
cation. After leaving school, he obtained a master of commerce from a govern-
ment degree college in Bijnor. At the same time, he studied for a polytechnic
diploma in commercial practice from a private technical institute. Brijpal com-
pleted his formal education at Nainital, where he obtained master of arts at a gov-
ernment degree college. Lacking close relatives in influential positions within
government service or large amounts of money to bribe state officials, Brijpal
had been unable to obtain a government job. In the mid-1990s, he had
worked on a voluntary basis as a clerk in a government subdistrict (tehsı¯l)
office and had then established a moderately successful agency selling cigarettes
(bı¯dı¯) in and around the village.
Brijpal defined himself as a new politician. He had enrolled in the DS-4 in
1987 and joined the BSP in 1993. He had occupied a position on the Ambedkar
Junior High School management committee in Nangal, served as a committee
member within the government pancha¯yat, and unsuccessfully stood for the
post of pradha¯n in the village pancha¯yat election. In addition, he acted as a lob-
byist for some other Chamars in Nangal in their dealings with the state.
Brijpal exemplified the social position of Chamar neta¯s in Nangal, who all
came from households possessing small amounts of land and some urban social
contacts. Of the six neta¯s in Nangal, four had university degrees and two had
high school qualifications. Three of the neta¯s managed moderately successful
small businesses in Nangal, two worked as contractors on construction projects
funded by the state’s Public Works Department, and one had a temporary job
in a government bank. All the new politicians were married, in three cases to
young women from urban areas.
Like Brijpal, naye neta¯s in Nangal did not hold formal political offices outside
the village, but three had good relationships with BSP politicians, and politicians
frequently sought naye neta¯s’ help in garnering support before an election,
raising political funds, and communicating political ideas. The Chamar neta¯s
sat on the management committees of local schools, held positions within the
pancha¯yat, and assisted in the introduction of new government programs. Influ-
enced by the rise of the BSP in UP and by a broader social process of “Ambed-
karisation” (Pai and Singh 1997), neta¯s worked within local nongovernmental
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organizations representing Chamar interests, including a youth organization, a
rotating credit scheme, and an adult literacy program. In addition, neta¯s com-
monly worked as intermediaries within clientelistic networks that linked rural
Chamars to local state officials. Like subaltern organic intellectuals in other con-
texts (Gramsci 1971), these men acted as political fixers in the efforts of friends
and relatives to accomplish tasks through state officials. These forms of political
brokerage were upsetting relationships between age and authority among
Chamars in the village. Educated naye neta¯s, with knowledge and experience
outside Nangal, were better able to exercise power than were older caste
members, who were increasingly dependent on younger men.
It is important to distinguish between the social and political work of Chamar
neta¯s and the efforts of government-employed Chamars to assist members of
their caste. Chamar neta¯s frequently argued that they were better positioned
to help rural Chamars in their dealings with the state than educated Chamar
young men who had entered government service. Some neta¯s claimed that
Chamars in government, who usually lived with their families in urban areas,
had forgotten the plight of Nangal’s Chamars. More commonly, they argued
that Chamars who had obtained government positions did not have the time,
influence, or confidence required to assist their peers in the village. Neta¯s
stressed that Chamars in government generally occupied low-ranking posts and
remained fearful of offending upper-caste superiors.
Against the grain of neta¯s’ statements, we spoke to two educated Chamar men
within government service who had assisted Chamars in Nangal. Birendra, born
around 1940 and possessing a twelfth-class certificate, had obtained a reserved
job as an office assistant in the Survey of India in 1971 and was posted in Delhi
in 2001, where he lived with his family. In 1978, Birendra had helped establish
Ambedkar Junior High School in Nangal and continued to play an advisory role
in thedevelopment of the school in 2001.Birendrahadalso established theAmbed-
kar Youth Organization (AYO) in the late 1970s. The AYO attempted to spread
knowledge of Ambedkar’s teachings through organizing debates and dramas
around the theme of Ambedkar’s life. The AYO had also raised funds for the
junior high school andwas building a function room forChamars inNangal in 2001.
In his early thirties in 2001, Jaibir had been similarly influential. In 1997,
Jaibir had obtained a post cleaning and repairing shoes in the Bijnor police
force. In the early 2000s, he commuted daily from Nangal to Bijnor. In this pos-
ition, he came into daily contact with senior figures in the police. On the basis of
the social relationship he developed with the superintendent of police, Jaibir was
able to mediate between Chamars in the village and the police force. He assisted
in the resolution of disputes involving Nangal Chamars and Jats or police officers,
and helped individual Chamars whom he felt had a legitimate basis for complain-
ing about police maltreatment. This evidence counters an argument made by
some observers of India that the entry of large numbers of Dalits into
government employment may deprive the community of political leaders (see
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Parry 1999). At the same time, however, government-employed Chamars
stressed that the pressures of their work, relative remove from rural affairs,
and limited influence prevented them from responding quickly and effectively
to the demands placed on them by rural members of their caste, and that unem-
ployed or underemployed naye neta¯s were better able to assume these roles.11
Neta¯s were also active in local government. Until the early 1990s, Chamars in
Nangal could not overtly question the right of the Jats to “lead” the village within
the pancha¯yat, and only once put forward a Chamar candidate for pradha¯n.12
But the 73rd Amendment Act of 1992, by reserving positions on the pancha¯yat
for SCs, offered a new path along which Dalits could seek power. In 1995, a new
politician named Jogender captured the post of pradha¯n. Jogender’s wife, Guria,
had formally won the post, since the pradha¯n position was reserved for an SC
woman. But Jogender assumed effective control of the pancha¯yat. As
pradha¯n, he improved the economic fortunes of a few poor Chamar households
by increasing the proportion of development resources reaching Chamar and
other Dalit areas of the village. Jogender ensured that thirty-eight households
received 20,000-rupee loans through a government housing scheme,13 bolstered
Chamar access to school scholarship money,14 and effectively lobbied the Block
11For an alternative reading of the political role of government-employed Dalits, see Jonathan
P. Parry (1999). Parry argues that Dalits employed in a large steel plant in Bhilai, eastern India,
have been able to play the types of practical and symbolic functions that we describe here as the
prerogative of naye neta¯s. While providing an important critique of some of the more pessimistic
accounts of the impact of low-caste politics and reservations on Dalit communities, Parry does not
adequately problematize the location of his account in an area of relatively abundant government
work. It is likely that relationships of dominance are more entrenched in most parts of northern and
central India than in the area surrounding a large government steel factory and in which there are
in-migrants from across India.
12During this period, rich Jats periodically sought reelection by distributing largesse within the
poorest parts of the village and intimidating voters on the eve of elections. For descriptions of
this process in neighboring Meerut District, see G. K. Lieten (1996).
13Since 1998, the government provided subsidized house loans through the Integrated Rural
Development Program for households formally identified as Below the Poverty Line. Of those
selected under this scheme, a household would receive a grant of 6,000 rupees and a further
14,000 rupees repayable at 12.5 percent annual interest. Of this 20,000 rupees, the government
expected the household to spend 17,000 rupees on their house and 3,000 rupees on a latrine.
Jogender tried to assist poor households in petitioning the Block Development Officer and
higher officers to release money through this scheme. In the allocation of housing loans, Jogender
prioritized assisting widows and those especially vulnerable within the village, and he favored
Chamars—and especially those from his own neighborhood and kinspeople—over other groups.
But recipients reported that they did not receive the full amount sanctioned and needed to pay
a share to Jogender and to other officials whose support they needed.
14According to records kept at the Block Development Office, in 2000–2001, 149,500 rupees was
allocated to Nangal children for scholarships. Jogender said that he paid close attention while
pradha¯n to ensuring that scholarship money reached target households. Rural people complained
about scholarship money arriving late, or of small sums being appropriated by the pradha¯n or
schoolteachers, but most Nangal villagers said that they received at least three-quarters of the
money to which they were formally entitled.
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Development Office for increased funds through a government employment
scheme, the Jawahar Rozga¯r Yojana.15
But neta¯s’ attempts to improve Chamars’ political power and prosperity mod-
erated rather than transformed processes of class and caste domination. Chamar
social initiatives failed in part because neta¯s sometimes prioritized their own
interests over those of their caste. In spite of trying to help many Chamar
families, Jogender defined himself as a profit-seeking broker (dala¯l). He admitted
that he had made a substantial amount of money working as pradha¯n, and our
survey work suggests that the beneficiaries of his efforts to acquire more devel-
opment resources for Chamars were concentrated among members of his
extended kinship group and friendship network. Neta¯s’ inability to effect a
more profound redistribution of political opportunities also reflected their
poorly coordinated approach to changing rural society. For example, in 1997,
after a series of factional disputes between different neta¯s in Nangal, a delegation
of new politicians finally went to petition the state government in Lucknow to
obtain financial assistance for Ambedkar Junior High School. Ironically, this
poorly planned and delayed expedition arrived in the state capital on the very
day that the BSP fell from power. The neta¯s returned empty-handed, and the
Jat-run private secondary school in Nangal remained much better funded than
the school bearing Ambedkar’s name. Broader consideration of Chamar associa-
tional activity in Nangal points in a similar direction: Only twenty-four Chamar
households had become involved in the Dalit rotating credit scheme, and few
Chamar young people attended the AYO. A neta¯-led adult education scheme
ceased altogether due to a lack of interest, and Jats blocked the efforts of
Chamars to build a hostel for visiting wedding parties.
The failure of the neta¯s to achieve a more radical social transformation also
reflects the continued regional dominance of the higher castes. Jats were well
equipped—economically, socially, and culturally—to counterresist lower-caste
political assertion. At the economic level, Jats imposed sanctions on Chamar
households that they perceived to be recalcitrant—for example, by withholding
pay for labor services performed or by refusing to allow Chamars to collect
fodder from their fields. Socially, Jats worked to broaden and expand their politi-
cal networks by investing efforts in securing government posts for their sons and
nurturing ties of mutual understanding and friendship within government
bureaucracies in Bijnor. In this context, many Chamars were forced to go to
15Jawahar Rozga¯r Yojana (JRY) was an employment scheme established in 1988 providing employ-
ment to rural laborers and basic building materials for the construction of houses and roads. Of the
JRY money, 60 percent had to be spent on labor; 22.5 percent was reserved for personal schemes
for SCs; 3 percent was for the disabled; and the remaining 14.5 percent could be spent on bricks. In
1999–2000, 139,500 rupees came to Nangal through the JRY, which provided only about 2,700 days
of labor per year for Dalits, equivalent to roughly five days of work each for landless household in
Nangal.
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Jats, rather than to Chamar neta¯s, in order to obtain assistance in matters relating
to the state. Some ordinary Chamars argued that powerful Jats were better able to
lobby local state officials on their behalf than Chamar leaders in the village. Finally,
at the cultural level, Jats sought to develop urban and urbane identities—for
example, through their clothes, educational strategies, and room decorations—
which served to mark new politicians and their Chamar peers as “backward”
(pichhe) or uncouth. In particular, many Jats constructed large multistoried
homes replete with modern goods, including televisions, refrigerators, and some-
times washing machines, which reinforced their local standing and separated them
physically from Chamars.
Neta¯s’ inability to coordinate their political actions and Jat counterresistance
combined to severely limit opportunities for ground-level political change. The
extent of continuity is especially evident in the case of the police, which contin-
ued to side with Jats in struggles over land, labor, or other resources (see Brass
1997). For example, in 1998, the police and local land revenue officer assisted
Jats in stealing a large portion of Chamar land from the center of Nangal. In
2001, the police and judiciary turned a blind eye when many Jats withheld
payment for agricultural labor and harassed Chamar women working in the
fields. New politicians were sometimes able to intervene in these types of
case, and we collected several examples of Brijpal and his peers preventing
the police from bullying Chamar villagers. But neta¯s had a limited stock of
influence, and there were simply too few of these local-level lobbyists to
serve the large number of poor Chamars in Nangal in their negotiations with
the state and dominant Jats. An understanding of the dialectics of dominance
and resistance in contemporary Nangal requires attention to the capacity of
naye neta¯s to mediate between “society” and “the state,” which are “new”
forms of political activity in rural western UP, and consideration of older struc-
tures of dominance that prevent them from effecting a more substantial shift in
power.
What emerged quite powerfully from our study was not just the frequency with
which higher-caste dominance reasserted itself in the practices of the police, poli-
ticians, and other state representatives but also the strength of Chamars’ feeling of
their poverty and social isolation. The prevailing political mood among Chamars
was one of despondency, cynicism, and thinly veiled anger. Rather than being part
of what some neta¯s called the “chain” linking particular rural people to higher offi-
cials, local people said that they felt themselves “isolated” (akela¯), “powerless”
(beka¯r), and “wandering” (ghu¯m rahe). A belief that others lacked the capacity to
empathize with the poor was woven through this sense of exclusion. In the type
of statement that we heard repeated numerous times, a Chamar male laborer
lamented,
Who will cry about our sadness? Who will listen to us? … How can we
complain to local state officials? The people to whom we would complain
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are the same people about whom we would be complaining! So in this
situation, we can do nothing. The Jats, in their big houses, are drinking
our blood.
Our account of naye neta¯s political practices contrasts with Krishna’s (2004)
discussion of political activists in Rajasthan and Gujarat, where similarly self-
styled “new politicians” are allegedly capable of building “inclusive institutional
structures” at the local level. By contrast, Chamar naye neta¯s work mainly for
some kin and political factions among the Chamars, and their efforts have been
piecemeal and contradictory even in this respect. The divergence between our
conclusions and those of Krishna (2004) regarding the social impact of naye
neta¯s’ activity largely reflects differences between the social geography of
Rajasthan/Gujarat and of western UP, where inequalities were more marked.
But the differences in our accounts also relate to theoretical and methodological
issues. In employing Putnam’s (1993) work on social capital, Krishna risks
downplaying analysis of class, caste, and gender inequalities in his research
area.16 Moreover, Krishna’s large-scale survey-based research, while possessing
obvious strengths, leaves him rather poorly equipped to discuss how other villagers
perceive naye neta¯s’ practices or measure their successes.17 Adopting a more
ethnographic approach, we suggest that new politicians only marginally improve
the access of the rural poor to resources in western UP and that new politicians
are thoroughly embroiled in processes that reproduce caste, class, and gender
inequalities.18
NAYE NETA¯S AS SOCIAL ANIMATORS
Neta¯s played an important role in expressing political critique in Nangal and
generating new forms of Chamar subjectivity. Chamars have long circulated ideas
16See also Ben Fine (2001), Jeffrey (2001), and John Harriss (2002). Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986)
notion of social capital predates the popular approaches advocated by James S. Coleman (1990)
and Putnam (1993) and offers a more refined and coherent basis for critical social enquiry. Bour-
dieu’s definition of social capital anticipates recent social scientific critiques of the term in several
ways. Most notably, it pays attention to the role of the state and other forces in shaping social capital
formation and avoids putting a positive or negative valuation on the possession of social capital.
17For example, Anirudh Krishna records that 53 percent of rural people responded to a question-
naire by noting that they approach naye neta¯s in order to negotiate with the police. But this tells us
rather little about how far marginalized agents are capable of convincing naye neta¯s to act on their
behalf or about the significance of durable inequalities in the negotiating positions of differently
equipped rural people.
18Krishna credits naye neta¯s with a capacity to escape caste as an ordering principle in society. He
writes, “By looking to caste as a possible source of influence for themselves, they [naye neta¯s] know
they would be playing into the hands of the old leadership” (2004, 78). This statement raises a host
of questions. Why have political parties not sought to mobilize naye neta¯s on a caste basis? Does
caste never act as a form of solidarity within informal political networks, for example within the
police? (see Brass 1997; Jeffrey 2000). And how and why has lower-caste indignation and anger
dissipated?
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critical of the dominant castes in the village, and Chamars’ verbal resistance to
the upper castes in western UP was recorded in the district gazetteers as early
as the 1890s (Nevill 1922). But Nangal’s new politicians were much more explicit
in their denunciations of caste than were an older generation of Chamar critics in
the village. For example, in a group discussion at which two Brahmins and a Jat
were present, Brijpal said,
Look at the atrocities committed by Hindus! They dump their liquor
bottles close to Dalit houses. They have made liquor so cheap so that
Dalits can buy it. Hindus do not accept that god is for everyone. No-
one can buy god. We won’t stay silent. We will raise our voices against
these atrocities. We will tell other people that we are not below
anyone. We want to have equal rights (haq) in the eyes of society.
As this statement implies, new politicians in rural Bijnor district tended to argue
that humiliation rather than economic deprivation was the principal stumbling
block in their rise to power. Naye neta¯s frequently used references to continued
caste discrimination in the village as a basis for defining their political project and
fostering indignation among other Chamars.
Neta¯s also used discussions of caste discrimination to stress the capacity of
Dalits to overcome oppression. They typically elaborated on this idea with refer-
ence to a small number of Dalit “great men” who had triumphed in the face of
higher-caste oppression. Neta¯s derived these stories from the speeches of Dalit
political leaders and they sometimes aped the gestures and rhetorical devices
of leading politicians. Brijpal spoke passionately in his polished Sanskritized
Hindi:
Jagjivan Ram19 visited a Hindu temple and afterwards they washed the
whole temple with milk! They thought that the whole temple had been
defiled by Jagjivan Ram’s visit. So you see the huge differences that
people construct in their minds? We should oppose any religion in
which people believe temples are ruined by Dalits’ feet. Jotirao
Phule20 was invited to a Thakur [upper caste] wedding. A Hindu priest
was reading from a sacred text. When the priest saw Jotirao Phule he
said “who invited him to the wedding! This has made the whole
wedding pointless! The marriage has been ruined! Who invited him?”
19Jagjivan Ram (1908–1986) was a Chamar from Bihar who became a leading figure in the Con-
gress movement from the 1930s onward. Jagjivan Ram (1980) proposed that Dalits should seek
to emulate higher castes within the existing Hindu caste system, which he did not explicitly critique.
20Jotirao Phule (1827–1890) was a member of the “untouchable”Mali (market gardener) caste who
grew up in Poona, South India. Phule became a prominent low-caste activist whose teachings were
founded on a vision of the distinctive non-Aryan origins of the Shudras and Atishudras (Dalits).
He rejected notions of social mobility by emulating higher castes. For details of Phule’s life and
work, see Gail Omvedt (1995).
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When people heard the priest’s words, the Thakurs said “pandit jı¯ what
can we do?” The priest replied: “Something can still be achieved by
beating the Chamar over the head with some shoes and driving him
back home.” On hearing this, the upper castes did what the priest had
said. They beat Phule and sent him home. Phule was badly insulted by
this. He decided that he should commit suicide. He saw no point in
living when he wasn’t going to be given any respect. While travelling
along a road, Jotirao met another Chamar who asked him “Jotirao,
where are you going?” Jotirao replied that he was going to kill himself.
The Chamar said that dying is not a solution to the problem of disrespect.
“You must fight for your rights [haq],” he said.
Much more than an older generation of Chamar critics in Nangal, who tended to
restrict their antipathy to caste oppression to occasional acts of resistance and
what James C. Scott (1985) has called “everyday forms of resistance,” neta¯s
argued that Chamars in Nangal should act on these stories of discrimination
and humiliation.
Neta¯s claimed that education could provide local Chamars with the skills,
knowledge, and bodily traits and capacities required to mount effective resistance
to the higher castes. Government, media, and development organizations’ rep-
resentations of progress through education shaped neta¯s’ narratives. Neta¯s
argued that education provides the reading, writing, and mathematical skills
required to protect Chamars from the threat of higher-caste trickery. They also
said that education offers the intelligence (hoshı¯ya¯rı¯) and individual and collec-
tive self-awareness ( jaga¯ru¯k) necessary for effective political resistance. The most
strident statements regarding the value of education for a program of Chamar
political empowerment related to the alleged role of education in instilling civi-
lizational traits and embodied confidence. In a typical statement, one neta¯ told us,
The greatest benefit of education is the appearance of civilization that it
provides. Men become civilized. They develop good manners. Others see
the benefits: they know that we are well-mannered.… Educated people
fearlessly demand their rights. Education provides so much confidence
that the educated aren’t afraid of any [government] official. And
people don’t try any nonsense with the educated because they know
that the educated possess knowledge and understanding of the law.
Neta¯s discussed confidence with reference to the terms himmat or hosla¯, which
commonly connoted courage in the face on adversity. But they were equally
eager to stress the importance of education in inculcating inner confidence
encapsulated in the Hindi word atmvishva¯s (literally, self-trust).
Building on these narratives of educational value, neta¯s argued that a person’s
ability to acquire and display an educated demeanor offers a more appropriate
basis for assessing their standing in society than caste ( ja¯tı¯). Neta¯s made this
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argument in a strong moral language and with reference to those aspects of
Chamars’ demeanor formerly associated with their caste subordination. They
praised the meticulous hygiene and careful self-presentation characteristic of
educated Chamars and contrasted images of educated Chamar cleanliness with
those of higher caste young men who drink alcohol, refuse to wash, and greedily
hoard money in their houses. In insisting upon education rather than caste as a
measure of respect and moral maturity, Chamar naye neta¯s also criticized and
sought to replace the abstract categories employed by the state to label them,
such as “Scheduled Caste” or “Below the Poverty Line” and stress their entitle-
ment to participate in modern politics as knowing, ethical, competent agents.
But in imagining a program of political reform centered on the transform-
ation of the Chamar body in local social space, neta¯s offered only a limited cri-
tique of the caste system. They did not seek to eradicate social hierarchies or
associated forms of subordination but argued instead that these stigmatizing
labels should not be attached to them as “educated people.”21 Neta¯s maintained
that higher castes who behaved in the manner of illiterates deserved disrespect,
and their ultimate goal was to invert rather than transcend the hierarchical caste
system. The politics of the Hindu Right also colored neta¯s’ political statements.
Chamar neta¯s emphasized Chamar progress through reference to the relative
backwardness of rural Muslims, who were depicted as having too many children,
possessing little interest in education, and being somehow more intimately con-
nected to the dirt and dust (dhu¯l mithı¯) of the village.
Neta¯s argued that Chamar political mobilization requires capturing state
power. They claimed that the BSP leader, Mayawati, had reformed the UP
bureaucracy and improved Dalits’ access to a variety of government programs.
During Mayawati’s tenure as chief minister in 1997, teachers arrived at local gov-
ernment schools promptly and bureaucrats were compelled to curb—or at least
disguise—their venality and discriminatory practices. Building on these obser-
vations, neta¯s also commonly argued that the BSP is capable of creating an
environment conducive to the expression of a new Chamar educated courage
(himmat) and unity (ekta¯). Neta¯s were similarly convinced that Mayawati’s
return to government would trigger wide-ranging reform of the police, judiciary,
and other arms of the local state. Underlying this belief in the BSP was a sense
that the government might effectively address the problems of Dalit poverty
and social isolation through policies aimed at improving Dalit representation
within educational institutions and government. Neta¯s energetically advanced
the view that reservations, while inadequate as a basis for wholesale Dalit empow-
erment, are an important tool for social mobility and symbol of Ambedkar’s poli-
tical labor.
21Scholars who have conducted research on Dalit politicians’ strategies in urban UP in the twentieth
century have made similar points (see Cohn 1954; Gooptu 1993; Khare 1984; Lynch 1969).
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Jats attempted to undermine neta¯s’ cultural work through two linked discur-
sive strategies. First, Jats questioned the cultural authority of educated Chamars,
who, they said, lacked “proper” (thı¯k) schooling credentials and were only
shaksha (qualified), not shikshit (educated). They also said that Chamars retain
certain distinctive markers (nisha¯nı¯) that mark them out as uncouth, such as nasa-
lizing their vowel sounds, engaging in inappropriately showy acts of consumption,
or failing to appreciate the “true value” of education. These critiques were some-
times infused with Hindu nationalist religious chauvinism: Jats marked Chamars
as inferior because low castes lacked the disciplined, moral education available in
the shishu mandı¯r primary schools run by Brahmins in Nangal and mainly enrol-
ling Jat children. That Jats chose to focus on education reflects neta¯s’ success in
delegimitizing public discussion of caste in Nangal. In public, at least, Jats were
not arguing that Chamars were inferior by dint of their birth but as a result of
various “traits” that they had failed to acquire in their households and through
schooling.
A second strategy employed by the Jats was to neutralize neta¯s’ critiques of
caste and class inequality by vastly exaggerating the scale and nature of Dalit
economic, social, and political transformation. They spoke of a Dalit revolution
(Dalit krantı¯) wherein Chamars, pampered by the state, now possessed more
money and greater political power than impoverished and isolated Jats. On
numerous occasions, Jats told us of Chamars moving around the village
showing off expensive consumer goods—Sony stereos, Western clothes, new
televisions—while impoverished Jats glumly worked the fields in their traditional
white kurta¯ pa¯yja¯ma¯. Jats used these stories to justify oppressive practices and
create a sense of shared caste solidarity in Nangal. Our urban interviews with gov-
ernment officials, teachers, and politicians suggest that the notion of a substantial
and ongoing Dalit revolution was also widely accepted by middle-class Dalits in
Bijnor town. This growing consensus around revolution militated against the for-
mation of ties between urban Dalit intellectuals and ordinary Chamars in rural
Bijnor District.
Notwithstanding Jat counternarratives, Chamars were partially effective in
promoting their political discourses among members of their caste in Nangal.
In circulating discourses critical of upper-caste discrimination, identifying a
new cultural ideology distinct from caste, and stressing the capacity of the
state to assist in processes of Chamar empowerment, neta¯s played a crucial
role in politicizing the local Chamar population. Naye neta¯s’ narratives raised
public awareness of caste discrimination, encouraged discussion of party and
regional politics in the village, and generated support for Mayawati and the
BSP. Neta¯s had also played a major role in encouraging people to vote.
But neta¯s were only partially successful in convincing other Chamars of their
vision of progress. Chamars frequently challenged neta¯s’ vision of the collective
strength of their caste—for example, by arguing that Chamars lack unity and that
the poor among the Chamars are socially isolated. Many parents contested the
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notion that formal school education would provide a firm basis for a program of
empowerment by speaking of the value of learning outside school and of the arro-
gance of the formally “educated.” In addition, most Chamars were skeptical
about the potential for Mayawati to transform people’s lives. Chamars said that
they voted for the BSP and that Mayawati’s stints as chief minister in 1995 and
1997 had been of “some benefit,” for example, in ensuring that government offi-
cials arrived at work on time. But most Chamars argued that their problems were
too chronic, varied, and entrenched to be solved by the BSP. Similarly, they said
that reservations in government employment amounted to a sop thrown to Dalits
to prevent widespread unrest. They went on to argue that a government truly
committed to raising Dalits’ position in society would improve laborers’ rights,
working conditions, and wages.
Disillusioned by neta¯s’ narratives of progress and their associated ideas of
acquiring power through education and state-led development, rural Chamars
often stressed the need for more radical political change—for example,
through state efforts to improve Chamars’ access to land, education, and
health care. These Chamars argued that “respect” for the low castes was impossi-
ble without a major redistribution in economic and social resources. In a typical
statement, a landless Chamar man told us that,
In my heart, I want to go into the Jat fields and set fire to them. We
[Chamars] go to do laboring work in the Jat fields and these bastards
swear at us and we come home dejectedly. May they be cursed, may
they become ill, may their children not be able to walk. In their hearts,
the Jats do not want the Chamars to be able to have stoves burning in
their homes; they want Chamar children to die hungry.
That Chamars felt willing and able to express these ideas to social researchers
reflects the success of naye neta¯s in politicizing caste inequality in the village.
Moreover, the use of the collective pronouns, “us” and “we,” by this laborer is
significant; there was a sense of collective possibility among Chamars in the
early 2000s that Craig Jeffrey did not observe in neighboring Meerut district in
the mid-1990s (Jeffrey 2001). But this sense of possibility had not led to a sub-
stantial transformation in the relationship between caste and power. Further-
more, the statements of anger that we heard from “ordinary” Chamars in
Nangal were not used—as they were among neta¯s—to express a sense of new
opportunity for change or as a preface to discussing the possibilities of state-
directed development. Rather, ordinary Chamars in Nangal believed that their
hardships and deprivations were multiplying and that politics (ra¯jnitı¯) was unli-
kely to alleviate their deprivation. In this context, many neta¯s struggled to main-
tain their credibility within the community, and many Chamar jokes centered on
the figure of the faintly ridiculous and overly optimistic local neta¯.
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CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of new politicians in UP should prompt a reevaluation of notions
of “Dalit revolution.” Several recent studies have proposed that widespread Dalit
political resistance in North India is resulting in a profound shift in the balance of
power at the local level. In this narrative, a “rural elite” comprising either upper
castes or locally dominant intermediate castes is increasingly being forced to
share power with Dalits (Jaffrelot 2003; Mendelsohn 1993). Jaffrelot (2003), in
particular, has argued that a transformation in local power relations in rural UP
is significantly advanced on the ground.
Our account provides some support for Jaffrelot’s argument. A small set of con-
fident, articulate, and socially skilful “new politicians” was becoming more promi-
nent among Chamars in Nangal in 2001. These men were improving poor
people’s access to state services, politicizing the Chamar population, and circulating
visions of ongoing political transformation. The rise of these naye neta¯s points to the
potential for formal political change combined with increased educational access to
improve the prospects of individual families from marginalized communities.
At the same time, however, our account suggests that the rise of the lower-
caste parties has not resulted in increased leverage and political power for
Dalits on the ground, as it has in South India (Hasan 2001) and in pockets of
UP where the higher castes are less dominant (Lerche 1995). The majority of
Chamars in Nangal remained dependent on a locally dominant caste of Jats.
Chamars were confined to poorly paid, insecure, manual wage labor and
owned little or no land. The entrenched nature of Chamar deprivation prevented
new politicians from generating a popular movement for social change or radi-
cally improving the political mood, and it restricts Dalits’ capacity to express
democratic ideas in the face of more powerful local actors. Contra Varshney,
then, there are important connections between people’s socioeconomic position
and their level of democratic engagement (see also Heller 2000).
The disjuncture between our account and those of Jaffrelot (2003) and Varshney
(2000) partly reflects methodological differences. In particular, Jaffrelot’s history of
lower-caste political change lacks close reflection on the links between national-level
policy changes and everyday political practice. Pai (2000) is more attentive to these
connections, but, like Krishna (2003), she moves too readily from the accounts of a
small group of Dalit “intellectuals” to draw broad conclusions about social upheaval.
Pai also studied highly unusual villages: semiurbanized settlements with a plentiful
supply of off-farm employment in a prosperous part of western UP. Akhil Gupta’s
(1998) more ethnographic analysis of changing rural politics reflects to a greater
extent on the diversity of Dalits’ political sensibilities. But he worked in a village
where almost all Dalits owned land and which lacked a strong class of rich farmers.22
22Unusually for villages in western UP at that time, only one of the rich farmers in Alipur owned a
tractor in the early 1980s (Gupta 1998).
1390 Craig Jeffrey, Patricia Jeffery, and Roger Jeffery
Pai and Gupta might respond by arguing that Nangal itself is in some way
“unusual.”We would acknowledge that there are aspects of the village, especially
Jats’ control over land and the distance of the village from nonfarm employment,
that would lead one to expect high levels of Dalit subordination. But middle-
ranking castes control landownership in large parts of western UP, and many
villages are located at a distance from nonfarm employment opportunities.
Moreover, there are dimensions of Nangal’s situation that make it more, not
less, likely that Dalit revolution would be taking place: Nangal possesses a
relatively high proportion of Chamars and is located in a district historically
associated with the rise of Mayawati.
Pai and Gupta might also counter our argument by noting that they are
only describing a partial transformation in the relationship between caste
and power, and this is certainly true of Pai’s (2002) most recent work. Jaffrelot
(2003), too, acknowledges the continued dominance of the higher castes over
some forms of economic and social influence in the conclusion to his influen-
tial book. For example, Jaffrelot claims that the dominant castes have been
much better able than Dalits to capture valued private-sector employment
in the wake of the liberalization of the Indian economy. Our argument is
therefore not that Jaffrelot wholly misrepresents the nature of social trans-
formation in the 1990s and early 2000s Uttar Pradesh. But, in foregrounding
political revolution, claiming that this revolution is “significantly advanced” on
the ground, and arguing that a full revolution is likely to occur “in the next
several decades,” Jaffrelot overstates the scale and inevitability of Dalit
social mobility in UP.
Jaffrelot, Pai, and Gupta might also challenge our analysis by claiming that,
even if lower caste politics has not substantially altered the distribution of
social and economic opportunities in society, the lower castes have neverthe-
less achieved much at the symbolic level, a point that has also been made by
Varshney (2000) and Kohli (2001). But this argument—that respect and con-
fidence not economic rights are the preoccupation of Dalits and that low
castes will derive satisfaction from the success of their leaders—has not
been adequately field-tested in contemporary India. Certainly, this argument
is at odds with the views of the majority of ordinary Dalits in Nangal who
believe that the goals of improving their access to resources and claiming
respect are intimately linked. Outside a small circle of neta¯s, Dalits in our
field area bitterly resented the BSP’s failure to address issues of distributive
justice in a credible manner.
We highlight these points mindful of how debates about social mobility
and revolution have been politicized on the ground. Some Jats in Nangal
advanced arguments about lower-caste “revolution” (krantı¯) to justify oppres-
sive practices and to convince others of Jat backwardness. This formed part of
a wider move among Jats to demonstrate their alleged social and economic
deprivation in order to obtain “Other Backward Class” status. In the early
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2000s, we met several Jats in a university in neighboring Meerut district who
translated articles on Dalit political advance available in such publications as
Frontline and Economic and Political Weekly into Hindi and circulated
these among students as evidence of Jats’ lowly position within local social
hierarchies.
Jaffrelot employs the term “silent revolution” to signal the relatively calm
nature of the social transformation he identifies, a calmness he links to the
gradual form that the revolution is taking and divisions within the lower-caste
movement. But we would do well to reflect on the analytical work that the
epithet “silent” performs. We have suggested that, insofar as Dalits were mobiliz-
ing for political change, they were doing so in a loud and articulate manner, and
their activity generated similarly noisy counterresistance on the ground. Indeed,
the process of “raising voice” (awa¯z utha¯na) has itself become an object of
discourse in grassroots processes of Dalit mobilization. The notion of “silent
revolution” detracts from these important aspects of local political struggle.
Our analysis therefore points to the need for an organizationally and cultu-
rally sensitive political economy approach to contemporary South Asian politi-
cal dynamics that accords Dalits’ own “voices” a prominent position. This
approach does not dispute the value of aggregated political analyses or of the
type of ethnographic work exemplified in Jaffrelot’s scholarship, but seeks to
hold alongside such accounts political anthropologic reflection on ground-
level practice and subjective understanding of political processes. This argu-
ment parallels Tania Li’s (2005) recent critical engagement with the work of
Scott (1998) on the state. Our appeal is for a closer engagement with what
Li’s calls metis, which she defines as contextualized forms of knowledge and
practice that lie outside the purview of state planners and tend to be ignored
in political science work. The appeal for a greater emphasis on this “messy”
sphere of practice takes on a particular urgency in a scholarly climate in
which fewer and fewer scholars of South Asia have the time, funding, and incli-
nation to conduct “fieldwork” in the traditional anthropological sense, and in
which there is often a marked disjuncture between formal political change
and ground-level political realities.
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